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Abstract 
Freedom of choice has been defined as the opportunity to choose alternative plans 
of action. In this fMRI study, we investigated how the perceived freedom of choice 
and the underlying neural correlates are influenced by the availability of options. 
Participants made an initial free choice between left or right doors before beginning a 
virtual walk along a corridor. At the mid-point of the corridor, lock cues appeared to 
reveal whether one or both doors remained available, requiring participants either to 
select a particular door or allowing them to freely choose to stay or switch their 
choice. We found that participants rated trials as free when they were able to carry 
out their initial choice, but even more so when both doors remained available. Multi-
voxel pattern analysis showed that upcoming choices could initially be decoded from 
visual cortices before the appearance of the lock cues, and additionally from the 
motor cortex after the lock cues had confirmed which doors were open. When 
participants were able to maintain the same choice that they originally selected, the 
availability of alternative options was represented in fine-grained patterns of activity 
in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Further, decoding accuracy in this region 
correlated with the subjective level of freedom that participants reported. These 
results suggest that there is neural encoding of the availability of alternative options 
in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and the degree of this encoding predicts an 
individual’s perceived freedom of choice. 
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Introduction 
Freedom of choice is associated with the availability of choice (Banja, 2015; Catania, 
1975; Monroe et al., 2014). It has been suggested that having options available to us 
is inherently rewarding because it fosters a sense of control, by allowing us to 
choose the option we believe to be optimal (Leotti & Delgado, 2011; Leotti et al., 
2010; Ryan & Deci, 2006). Others have proposed that individuals seek to keep a 
number of options open in order to maintain a state where they foresee greater 
potential to influence their environment (Friston et al., 2015; Klyubin et al., 2005). 
Previous findings suggest that neural representations of an upcoming choice reflect 
the number of options under consideration, where free choices are associated with 
more flexible preparation of multiple options (Filevich & Haggard, 2013; Salvaris & 
Haggard, 2014). The availability and encoding of options may therefore influence the 
perceived freedom of a choice while individuals prepare to make decisions.  
Freedom of choice is commonly considered to depend on the availability of options 
from which to choose and to be diminished by external constraints that limit choice 
(Monroe & Malle, 2010). This implies that an individual’s experience of volition is 
innately tied to perception of their possibilities in the external world. Computational 
theories propose that in dynamic environments individuals maintain an internal model 
of the environment that represents the potential actions that they can take at any one 
time (Klyubin et al., 2005; Klyubin et al., 2008). This predicts that an individual is 
driven to be in a state of ‘empowerment’, where one believes that multiple differing 
future states could be attained through their actions (Klyubin et al., 2005; Klyubin et 
al., 2008). The belief that an individual can reach these future states may be 
supported by maintaining multiple action representations online during the process of 
preparing an upcoming decision (Cisek, 2006; Filevich & Haggard, 2013).  
In action selection tasks, it has been found that neural representations of all available 
options are initially activated and neural activity for the chosen option increases over 
time leading to a decision, concurrent with a decrease in activity for the non-chosen 
option (Cisek, 2006; Cisek & Kalaska, 2005). Studies suggest that individuals 
continue to consider available options throughout the time leading to a decision when 
given the freedom to choose, in contrast to when they are instructed (Rens et al., 
under review)(Fleming et al., 2009). Further, evidence suggests that freely chosen 
actions are less strongly encoded in the preparatory decision period than instructed 
actions and, in turn, more flexibly updated in response to environmental cues 
(Fleming et al., 2009; Salvaris & Haggard, 2014). This raises the possibility that free 
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decisions are associated with a state in which the alternative, unselected options 
remain actively encoded (Filevich & Haggard, 2013; Fleming et al., 2009).  
Investigating the perceived freedom of choice provides the opportunity to identify 
where free choices, and their associated subjective experience, arise in the brain 
(Filevich et al., 2013). This approach was spearheaded by Filevich et al. (2013), who 
studied the subjective experience of free choice in a task requiring participants to 
freely generate a number in a random sequence. These authors found that 
participants rated choices as less free if there were fewer perceived options available 
(Filevich et al., 2013). However, the relationship between the availability of options 
and the brain regions that differed in activity according to subjective ratings was not 
directly investigated. We reasoned that if the awareness of the options in the 
environment contributes to the sense of freedom individuals feel in their upcoming 
choices, the subjective experience of freedom may be related to the neural 
representation of an upcoming choice. 
In order to investigate whether perceived freedom of choice is related to neural 
encoding of available options, we designed a decision-making task in a virtual 
environment that participants performed during functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (fMRI). At the start of each trial, participants were asked to freely choose 
between left and right doors that were situated at the end of a corridor. After making 
their choices, participants advanced up the corridor to a halfway point, where lock 
cues indicated whether one or both doors remained open. If both doors were open, 
participants were free to either continue with their original choice or switch to the 
other door; if one door was locked, participants were required to select the remaining 
open door. This resulted in some trials in which participants were forced to switch, 
but crucially also trials in which participants could continue with their initial choice, 
but the alternative option was removed. Participants rated how free they felt their 
choice to be at the end of each trial. Using multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA), this 
design allowed us to examine the neural encoding of choices prior to door selection 
and, more importantly, to predict the availability of an alternative option. Specifically, 
in cases where participants continued with their initial choice, we examined 
differences in neural representation when the alternative door was available 
compared to when it was not. We then examined the relationship between the 
decoding of options and participants’ perceived freedom of choice. We hypothesised 
that trials in which both doors remained open would be rated as freer than trials 
where one door was locked, even when participants could continue with their initial 
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choice, and that the perceived freedom of choice would correspond to neural 
representations of the availability of an alternative option.    
 
Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Twenty-five participants were recruited after providing written informed consent. All 
participants were right-handed, had normal or corrected to normal vision, and no 
history of psychiatric disease, neurological trauma or disorder. One participant was 
excluded for not following the task instructions, and data from the remaining 24 
participants were used for the behavioural analyses (15 female, mean age 24 years, 
range 20-32 years). Participants were monetarily compensated for their time. The 
University of Queensland Medical Research Ethics Committee approved the 
experiment. 
Experimental task 
Participants underwent a brief training session with instructions outside the scanner 
prior to completing the experimental task in a 3T MRI scanner. The task was based 
in a virtual environment, presented using Psychtoolbox on MATLAB (MathWorks, 
Inc., Natick, MA, USA). The paradigm is shown in Figure 1. The task environment 
consisted of a corridor with two doors at the end that participants needed to advance 
towards to select. Participants viewed a first-person perspective of the three-
dimensional corridor from their current position, which updated continuously as they 
moved. At the start of the trial, a message to ‘Choose now’ appeared, asking 
participants to choose freely at this time between the left and right doors. They 
subsequently advanced up the corridor by holding down a button with the left index 
finger. At the halfway point, left and right lock cues appeared for 0.8s. If both locks 
were displayed as open, both doors were available and participants were permitted 
to either stay with their initial choice (Choice Stay) or to change their mind and select 
the other door (Choice Switch). If one of the locks was closed while the other one 
was open, participants could only select whichever door remained unlocked. 
According to the door the participants had initially chosen, this was either congruent 
with their initial choice (No Choice Stay) or it forced them to change their selection to 
the other door (No Choice Switch). In summary, while each trial always started out 
with a free choice, the experimental manipulation at halfway point resulted in four 
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conditions, which differed in a) Choice Availability, i.e. whether the alternative door 
was still available, and b) Choice Response, i.e. whether a stay or switch decision 
occurred.  
The distance of the corridor from the start to halfway and from halfway to doors was 
equivalent to approximately 4s for each section, with small variation introduced by 
participant key presses. Participants acted on their decision as they reached the 
doors by using the right index or middle finger for left and right doors, respectively. A 
star appeared after selection of any available door as a token reward. If participants 
chose a locked door, a red cross appeared and the trial was recorded as an error. 
Catch trials occurred periodically (6 trials per block) in which a stop sign cue was 
presented shortly after participants started to move up the corridor. Participants had 
a brief time window of 1s to input which door they were planning to choose. These 
trials were designed to ensure that participants remained attentive and followed 
instructions to choose a door at the start of each corridor. Longer response times 
were interpreted as a failure of having formed an initial choice, and an error resulted. 
Following each trial, participants provided a rating of their perceived level of freedom 
on a free-sliding visual analogue scale from ‘Not free’ (0) to ‘Very free’ (10) (Filevich 
et al., 2013). Participants were instructed to give this rating according to their own 
interpretation of “free”. A final screen also prompted them to indicate whether their 
decision had changed during the trial using a ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ response screen, on which 
the position of the response alternatives was counterbalanced to circumvent 
stereotypical and automated responding. This allowed us to determine the initial 
decision for each trial, given the combination of condition (displayed locks) and final 
selection. Each trial was separated by a fixation cross, jittered at 3, 5 or 7s to enable 
deconvolution of the haemodynamic response function (HRF). There were five 
functional runs of 24 trials, each with an equal number of pseudo-randomised Choice 
and No Choice trials. A brief questionnaire on the perception of the task conditions 
was administered at the end of the session once outside the scanner, asking 
participants to rate the subjective level of freedom of the different decision conditions 
and provide detail on their experience and any decision-making strategies. 
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Figure 1 Experimental paradigm in the virtual environment for a single trial. At the 
start of each trial, the corridor with two doors at the end became visible and text 
appeared, asking participants to “Choose now” before they began to move up the 
corridor. At the halfway point, lock cues appeared, indicating whether one or both 
doors were available (“unlocked”). The position of the open locks corresponded to 
the position of the doors that were unlocked. Participants continued to the end of the 
corridor, where they selected either the left or right door. Every choice for an open 
door resulted in a star that was displayed after choosing the door. Participants then 
reported “How free” they felt their choice had been and, finally, indicated whether 
their choice had changed during the course of the trial. The trial shown gives an 
example of a No Choice Stay trial, where the participant initially chose the right door, 
and the halfway cue revealed that this door was available, but the left door was 
locked. Catch trials occurred periodically, represented by a stop sign cue appearing 
early in the trial, to ensure that participants actively made decisions at the beginning 
of each trial. 
 
fMRI acquisition  
MRI volumes of the whole brain were acquired with a Siemens Trio 3T scanner 
(Erlangen, Germany) using a standard 32-channel head coil. Functional images were 
acquired until the end of each block (depending on speed of task completion) using a 
gradient-echo echo-planar imaging sequence (GE-EPI) with simultaneous multi-slice 
acquisition (multi-band slice acceleration factor=4, 44 axial slices, TR=800ms, 
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TE=30.0ms, FA 60°, FOV 200x200mm, voxel size=2.7mm2, slice thickness=2.7mm 
with 10% slice gap). A high-resolution T1-weighted structural scan was acquired 
(TE=2.89ms, TR=4000ms, FA = 6°/7°, FOV 256×256mm, voxel size=1mm3). Five 
functional runs with approximately 600-700 volumes were recorded, according to 
individual time to complete each trial. The first 12s of scans of each run were 
discarded to avoid magnetic saturation effects.  
fMRI pre-processing 
All data was first pre-processed using SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Cognitive 
Neurology, University College London, London, UK). The images were spatially 
realigned using a six-parameter affine transformation to account for effects of 
participant movement. As MVPA was performed on the data, no further spatial 
normalisation or smoothing was applied at this stage. However, the T1 structural 
image was co-registered to the mean of the realigned functional images and then 
spatially normalised to MNI space using the segment process of SPM8 to obtain 
normalisation parameters for the MVPA accuracy maps. 
Multi-voxel pattern analysis 
MVPA was performed using custom scripts run in MATLAB (Bode et al., 2013) in 
conjunction with SPM8. A first-level general linear model (GLM) was first estimated 
for each individual participant based on motion corrected, non-normalised, 
unsmoothed data to produce parameter estimates for each voxel in each run and 
each condition. Beta images (condition x run + six motion correction parameters per 
run) were estimated for each participant. Separate GLMs were run according to the 
type of decision category being examined. For the model of door choice, each trial 
was sorted by decision (Left or Right), separately for the two phases of the trial, 
resulting in two regressors for the trial start to halfway point and a second set of two 
regressors for the period between cue until the door choice (note that trial start and 
half-way point choices were not always for the same door, e.g. on switch trials, thus 
providing effective temporal jitter between consecutive Left and consecutive Right 
decisions in the GLM design). The model was the basis for a two-way classification 
analysis with chance accuracy = 50%. A second model, to classify between Choice 
Stay and No Choice Stay conditions was designed to investigate patterns of activity 
associated with the availability of choice options when the actual behaviour (to stay 
with the initially chosen door) was identical. As this distinction was only meaningful 
for the second half of the trial, regressors were based on the period between halfway 
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point and door selection. The model was the basis for a two-way classification 
analysis with chance accuracy = 50%. As behavioural results showed that 
participants rarely freely chose to switch their door choice, no further models 
including Switch conditions were analysed. In all models, an additional regressor of-
no-interest accounted for catch trials and errors and was not included in the following 
decoding analyses. Two participants exhibited a strong position bias for the left door 
(>70% trials), which provided insufficient data to train left and right choices, and were 
therefore excluded from MVPA. 
A standard searchlight approach (Kriegeskorte et al., 2006) based on the parameter 
estimates from each run (Bode et al., 2013; Haynes et al., 2007) was then applied to 
data from each individual participant separately. Pattern vectors for each condition 
were constructed from data extracted from a spherical cluster (3 voxel radius) 
centred in turn on each voxel in the brain. Next, a linear support vector machine 
classifier based on the LibSVM library (Chang & Lin, 2011) was trained on pattern 
vectors from the same cluster from all runs but one and tested on the remaining run. 
This analysis was cross-validated five times by independently repeating the training 
of the classifier on data from all combinations of four runs and using the data from 
each left-out run as the test data once. The average classification accuracy across 
these cross-validation steps from the respective cluster was assigned to its central 
voxel. This way, after running the analysis for all possible clusters in the brain, whole-
brain classification accuracy maps for each individual were created separately for 
each of the classification analyses. To prepare the data for group-level statistical 
analyses, the individual classification accuracy maps were spatially normalised to the 
standard MNI template in SPM and smoothed using an 8mm FWHM Gaussian 
kernel. The accuracy maps were then entered into a one-sample t-test to identify 
voxels where classification was significantly above chance. Statistical maps were 
reported for clusters ≥ 10, at a voxel-level threshold corrected for multiple 
comparisons (p<0.05 FWE-corrected). Finally, we also conducted univariate group 
analysis of GLM parameters for each of the models, using single-sample t-tests, to 
investigate whether any multivariate differences from the searchlight MVPA analysis 
could be explained by differences in overall activation level between conditions. 
Behavioural and neural correlation analyses 
A two-way repeated measures ANOVA was performed on ratings of perceived 
freedom of choice for the factors Choice Availability (Choice or No Choice) and 
Choice Response (Stay or Switch). Significant interaction effects were followed with 
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pairwise t-tests, Bonferroni-corrected for multiple comparisons. In order to investigate 
relationships between the perceived freedom of choice ratings with decoding 
accuracy, we normalised participants’ ratings using z-transformation. We then ran 
Pearson correlations between the peak classification accuracy in each significant 
cluster from the Choice Stay vs No Choice Stay classification analysis and 
normalised perceived freedom of choice ratings across participants. This analysis 
aimed to provide an indicator of whether the discriminability between neural patterns 
that related to the availability of choice alternatives would correspond to perceived 
freedom of choice. Finally, we calculated a Pearson correlation between the 
classification accuracy for the same analysis (Choice Stay vs No Choice Stay) in the 
same clusters and the individual probability of Choice Switch trials to determine the 
relationship between neural representation of alternative options and the likelihood of 
participants to choose to switch.  
 
Results 
Behavioural performance and free choice ratings  
Participants performed the task according to instructions, on average selecting the 
available door on 98.5% (SD=3.6%) of No Choice trials and responding in time to 
96.7% (SD=4.5%) of the catch trials. Door selection was well balanced overall with a 
slight bias towards the left door, which was selected with the index finger, in both 
task trials (M=54.1%, SD=12.2%) and catch trials (M=53.6%, SD=16.3%). Of note, 
this included two participants who exhibited a strong bias of greater than 80%. 
Switches were reported on 47.8% (SD=6.2%) of No Choice trials, in line with the 
chance nature of selecting the same door as the pseudorandom task assignment. In 
Choice trials, participants on average only opted to switch doors on 17.3% 
(SD=22.1%) of the trials (Choice Switch). However, the proportion of Choice Switch 
trials greatly varied across participants (range 0 to 71.7%). Four participants never 
chose to switch, so free ratings were not available for their Choice Switch trials. In 
the post-session questionnaire, when asked on what basis participants judged how 
free their decisions were, participants indicated the ability to perform their own initial 
choice (17/24), the availability of options (10/24) and the feeling of the decision (4/24; 
Supplementary Data). 
Average ratings of perceived freedom of choice differed across conditions (Figure 2). 
A two-way repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of Choice Availability, 
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F(1,19)=45.608, p<0.001, a main effect of Choice Response, F(1,19)=26.651, 
p<0.001, and most importantly, a significant interaction between the two factors, 
F(1,19)=26.607, p<0.001. Post-hoc t-tests, Bonferroni-corrected for multiple 
comparisons, showed that Choice trials were rated as freer than No Choice trials in 
both cases where participants stayed with their initial choice (t(23)=4.885, p<0.001; 
Choice Stay: M=8.24, SD=1.28, No Choice Stay: M=6.37, SD=1.76) and switched to 
the alternative door (t(19)=6.891, p<0.001; Choice Switch: M=8.13, SD=1.52, No 
Choice Switch: M=3.17, SD=2.02). No Choice Stay trials were also perceived as 
significantly more free than No Choice Switch trials, t(23)=5.944, p<0.001, but there 
was no significant difference in ratings between Choice Stay trials and Choice Switch 
trials, t(19)= 0.432, p=0.7. 
 
Figure 2 Average ratings of perceived freedom of choice given on a sliding scale of 
0-10 after each trial. Choice conditions were rated as significantly freer than No 
Choice conditions, both for trials where participants stayed with their initial choice 
and trials where participants switched their choice. No Choice Switch trials were 
rated significantly less free than No Choice Stay trials. *** p<0.001 
 
Multi-voxel pattern analysis 
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First, we investigated from which brain regions we could predict participants’ choices 
during each half of the corridor (Figure 3). During the period from the start of the trial 
to the halfway point, before the cues were presented, participants’ intention to 
choose the left or right door could be decoded from a cluster in the visual cortex 
(p<0.05 FWE-corrected), with an average decoding accuracy of 76% (26% above 
chance). Once the cues were visible, from the halfway point until the end of the 
corridor, decoding in the visual cortex remained significant, at an accuracy of 76% for 
Choice trials and 80% for No Choice trials. An additional cluster in the left motor 
cortex represented choice information at this stage at an accuracy of 70% for No 
Choice trials (p<0.05 FWE-corrected); in Choice trials, this motor cortex cluster 
represented choices with 63% accuracy and was not significant at an FWE-corrected 
level (p<0.001 uncorrected). Decoding in the left motor cortex is likely to reflect the 
mapping of chosen location to motor plans (the index and middle fingers of the right 
hand were always mapped onto the left and the right door position, respectively). At 
the same uncorrected threshold level (p<0.001), an additional cluster in the 
precuneus was found to be predictive of choice outcomes with 59% accuracy in the 
Choice condition only. Univariate group analysis, using single-sample t-tests, showed 
significantly greater overall activation level in one cluster of left visual cortex for Left 
choices versus Right choices at the trial start (peak co-ordinates -26, -86, -8; peak z 
= 4.15; cluster extent = 153 voxels; PFWE < 0.05) and at the corridor mid-point (peak 
co-ordinates -14, -92, 2; peak z = 5.40; cluster extent = 811 voxels; PFWE < 0.05), and 
one cluster of right visual cortex for Right choices versis Left choices at the corridor 
mid-point (peak co-ordinates 14, -82, 12; peak z = 4.73; cluster extent = 156 voxels; 
PFWE < 0.05). There were no significant univariate differences in activation level in 
motor brain regions at either time point. 
We next examined patterns of activity that allowed for the decoding of the availability 
of choice options for Choice Stay vs No Choice Stay conditions. In these conditions, 
participants engaged in the same choice behaviour and stayed with their original 
chosen door, with the only difference being whether or not the alternative door 
remained free to choose after the locks appeared. We reasoned that the 
distinguishing difference between the two conditions would therefore be the 
availability of an alternative option. We found that two clusters in the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) were predictive of the availability of an option, including 
right middle frontal gyrus (MFG; peak MNI coordinates [36 35 34]), with a decoding 
accuracy of 63%, extending to the right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG; peak MNI 
coordinates [21 32 -5]), with an accuracy of 57% (Figure 4A); (p<0.05 FWE-
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corrected). Univariate group analysis showed no significant differences in overall 
activation level between these conditions anywhere in the brain (voxel-level and 
cluster-level PFWE > .05). 
 
Figure 3 Whole-brain searchlight decoding revealed regions where patterns of voxel 
activity predicted a left or right choice, separated by choice condition (Choice in red 
and No Choice in blue) and trial period (left: start to halfway; right: halfway cues to 
door). Patterns of activity in the visual cortex, left motor cortex and precuneus (for 
Choice trials) predicted choice outcomes. Decoding results are displayed at an 
uncorrected threshold of p<0.001. 
Relationship between decoding maps and free choice ratings  
Next, we investigated whether the patterns of activity in the main right MFG cluster or 
the right IFG that were predictive for the ongoing availability of choice options were 
also related to the participants’ subjective experience of free choice. We 
hypothesised that if patterns in these clusters represented the alternative door, more 
distinct patterns of activity would correspond to greater perceived freedom when both 
options were available in Choice trials, and conversely less perceived freedom in No 
Choice trials. We therefore correlated the average decoding accuracy from these 
clusters for each individual with their average free choice ratings for Choice Stay and 
No Choice Stay trials separately. In the right MFG, we found a significant positive 
correlation (r=0.61, p=0.002) between decoding accuracy and how free participants 
reported the Choice Stay trials to be (Figure 4B). We also found a significant 
negative correlation between decoding accuracy and the perceived freedom of 
choice in the Forced-Stay condition (r=-0.49, p=0.02; Figure 4C). We found no 
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correlation between decoding accuracy in the IFG and perceived freedom in either 
condition (r<0.01, ps>0.10). These results confirm that the discriminability of patterns 
in the MFG was related to both the perception of more freedom in the Choice 
condition as well as of less freedom in the No Choice condition.  
Finally, we aimed to investigate whether greater encoding of the alternative door 
when it was available further corresponded to a higher likelihood that the participant 
would choose to freely switch doors overall. We correlated decoding accuracy in the 
MFG with the frequency of choice switches participants made. This Pearson 
correlation analysis revealed a positive significant relationship of r=0.43, p=0.04, 
indicating that participants with higher decoding accuracy in this region switched their 
choice more frequently. 
 
 
Figure 4 A) Whole-brain searchlight decoding for availability of choice options 
(Choice Stay vs No Choice Stay) under conditions of identical choices. We found a 
significant cluster in the right MFG (decoding accuracy 63%), which extended into 
the right IFG (decoding accuracy 57%). Decoding results are displayed at an 
uncorrected threshold of p<0.001. B) Pearson correlation for the average decoding 
accuracy (Choice Stay vs No Choice Stay) with the perceived freedom of choice 
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across all participants for Choice Stay trials, and C) with the perceived freedom of 
choice for No Choice Stay trials. Both correlation coefficients were significant. 
 
 
Figure 5 There was a significant positive correlation between the average decoding 
accuracy (Choice Stay vs No Choice Stay) and the frequency of switch decisions 
during the experiment across all participants. 
Discussion 
We sought to determine whether the availability of choice influences the perception 
of freedom and the neural representation of choice in voluntary decision-making. We 
found that participants’ subjective experience of freedom was dependent on both the 
number of open locks at the half-way point, as well as whether participants were 
forced to switch to a different choice option or could stay with the initially chosen one. 
We interpret this finding as participants’ subjective experience of freedom depending 
on the ongoing availability of options during decision preparation. Participants rated 
choices as significantly freer in cases where both doors remained available to select, 
in contrast to when only the same initially freely chosen option was still available. A 
likely interpretation of this scenario is that simply eliminating the availability of an 
alternative door reduced the perceived freedom, even though the participant’s initial 
choice could still be made. Decoding the choice conditions in which participants 
freely stayed with their initial choice or were required to stay by the presence of a 
locked door revealed that availability of choice was represented in fine-grained 
patterns of activity in frontal regions in the MFG and IFG. The accuracy with which 
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these conditions could be decoded from the MFG correlated with the perceived level 
of freedom individuals reported. We further found a positive correlation of decoding 
accuracy in the same region with the frequency with which participants freely 
switched when both doors were available. Together, this indicates that perceived 
freedom of choice may relate to neural activity encoding the available options in the 
environment.  
In order to investigate subjective freedom of choice, we asked participants to report 
how free they felt for each decision without specifying how the participants were to 
judge freedom (Filevich et al., 2013). Critically, the use of self-report allowed for a 
graded metric of free choice based on participants’ own interpretations (Callard & 
Fitzgerald, 2014; Filevich et al., 2013). We found that participants’ perceived freedom 
for their choices was significantly influenced by the availability of options. When the 
opportunity remained to select the other door, or change one’s mind, participants 
rated their choices as significantly freer than when the other door was locked. A 
number of studies have indicated that people display a preference for having choice, 
even when it provides no additional benefit (Bown et al., 2003; Leotti & Delgado, 
2011; Suzuki, 2000). It is often thought that this preference is related to a sense of 
agency in being able to make a choice (Leotti et al., 2010; Ryan & Deci, 2006). In our 
study, participants freely chose at the start of every trial but reported greater freedom 
for trials where both doors remained open than trials where they found the 
alternative, non-chosen, door was locked. This is particularly interesting in light of the 
fact that our participants rarely chose to freely switch their decision, with some 
participants never choosing to do so. Therefore, our findings suggest that it is not 
simply making a choice but the ongoing availability of options that contributes to a 
sense of free choice.  
With regards to the specific left or right decision, we found that the upcoming 
decision could be decoded from neural activity in the visual cortex from the start of 
the corridor in all conditions. Furthermore, univariate analysis showed that this 
significant MVPA decoding in the visual cortex was also associated with a significant 
difference in the overall level of activation within regions of the left and right visual 
cortex (although only significant from the trial half-way point in the right visual cortex). 
We suggest that this most likely reflects participants visually attending differently to 
the doors, based on spatial positions, depending on their door choice. Note that our 
study was not designed to further understand the exact nature of this representation. 
Following the lock cues, the left or right door choice could be decoded from the left 
motor cortex (although only significant at a corrected level for Choice conditions), 
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suggesting differences in motor preparatory activity for the right index and middle 
fingers, to match the left or right door, respectively. Thus, it appears that participants 
may have relied on visual attention initially to for the upcoming choice, and only 
translated it into a specific motor plan once the options were known. We found 
evidence of less reliable decoding, particularly in the motor cortex, when both doors 
remained open. One could speculate that this reflects that participants continued to 
deliberate the choice when provided with options. This would be in line with previous 
studies that have shown that free choices are less strongly encoded in the brain than 
instructed choices (Fleming et al., 2009; Salvaris & Haggard, 2014).  
We further found that the availability of choice could be decoded from regions in the 
right MFG and IFG when comparing only the conditions in which participants 
continued with their initial choice. It should be noted that participants had already 
formed their intention prior to seeing the cues, therefore other factors of the choice, 
including the maintenance of their initial intention and motor preparation, were 
equivalent; in both cases participants were able to select the door they had initially 
chosen. These regions are part of the DLPFC, which is involved in maintaining task-
relevant information online, especially in the transmission of sensory information to 
prospective motor plans (Curtis & D'Esposito, 2003). Activation of the MFG, in a 
similar cluster to ours, has been previously associated with sustained visuospatial 
attention during tasks requiring object information to be held online for an upcoming 
response (Babiloni et al., 2005; Curtis et al., 2004; Ricciardi et al., 2006). While this 
could be related to either spatial memory or prospective motor preparation, efforts to 
dissociate these effects have suggested that MFG activity is more specifically 
associated with spatial memory (Curtis et al., 2004). In our task, participants were 
required to keep in mind the available doors to choose as they approached their 
position in the virtual environment. Thus, the availability of one or both doors could 
be expected to differentially recruit visuospatial information storage. This might have 
resulted in slightly enhanced signal strength in some voxels in MFG that could have 
been picked up by the classifier; it might also have resulted in different pattern of 
encoding, or a mixture of both. While our study was not designed to tease apart 
these possible explanations, it clearly shows that the change in available options was 
reflected in MFG activation patterns. 
MFG activity has also been found to increase prior to freely made attentional shifts 
between left and right visual streams (Gmeindl et al., 2016). This was proposed to 
reflect the intention to re-orient attention to the alternative option. There are notable 
parallels between this study and our current findings, where we could decode from 
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the same region under conditions when a second option was available for 
consideration. Based on our previous findings of more visual fixations to alternative 
options for free than instructed decisions (Rens et al., submitted), it is likely that 
participants attended more to the alternative door when it remained open than when 
it was locked. This is also in line with our finding of a correlation between decoding 
accuracy in this region and the likelihood that participants freely switched their 
choice. Even though the decoding accuracy was derived from conditions in which no 
switch occurred, one possible interpretation is that more distinct patterns of activity in 
this region reflected greater consideration of the alternative door and this, in turn, 
was linked to a higher probability of an ensuing decision to switch. Overall, our 
findings support the view that activity in this region corresponded to consideration of 
options in the environment in order to prepare an upcoming decision (Gmeindl et al., 
2016). 
Remarkably, we further found that the difference in activity patterns in the MFG, 
corresponding to the availability of choice, was strongly correlated with the perceived 
freedom of choice individuals reported. Decoding accuracy in the MFG for each 
participant correlated positively with the perceived freedom of choice when both 
doors were available, and negatively with the perceived freedom for trials in which 
the alternative (non-chosen) door was locked. This suggests that individuals who had 
a more distinct neural representation of the availability of choice, and hence possibly 
greater consideration of the alternative door, were more likely to perceive their 
choices as being freer and, conversely, more likely to perceive the absence of 
options as less free, even when they were still able to select the door that they 
initially chose. Alternatively, these individuals could have had a higher propensity for 
perceiving freedom of choice, which may have led to more distinct neural 
representations of the presence of choice options. Freedom of choice has often been 
linked to the availability of options through self-report measures (Banja, 2015; 
Catania, 1975; Monroe & Malle, 2010), but we provide evidence that the subjective 
experience of free choice can be linked to neural representations of the availability of 
choice.  
It has been suggested that subjective freedom of choice relates to the degree to 
which the environment precludes alternative options, rather than strictly to the degree 
of choice (Filevich et al., 2013). We extend this to propose that perceived freedom 
may be experienced at an individual level according to how strongly individuals 
weigh the options available to them. Our interpretation aligns with that suggested by 
Filevich and Haggard (2013), whereby individuals maintain an internal model of 
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available options in the environment and this contributes to a feeling of free choice. 
We expand on this theory by showing that the removal of an option, by a locked 
door, appeared to change the choice representation in a dynamic task setting, but to 
a different extent across individuals. Of note, in a previous study the reaction times 
for choosing between options appeared to reflect the initial number of options, rather 
than the final reduced set (Filevich & Haggard, 2013). However, our study provides 
evidence that a locked door resulted in an updated choice representation with a 
reduced level of freedom. The reason why we find evidence of an updated choice 
representation may be that participants in our study had longer to update (4s in 
comparison to up to 1.5s). Alternatively, the interactive nature of the task 
environment may have encouraged more flexible updating. These factors remain to 
be investigated with future studies.   
An outstanding question is why having multiple options would harbour a sense of 
freedom, particularly in experimental settings such as these, where there is nothing 
to be gained from selecting either of the doors. Likewise, it is perplexing that humans 
and other animals will select or even pay for the opportunity for choice when it 
provides no benefit (Bown et al., 2003; Catania, 1975; Leotti & Delgado, 2011; Ono, 
2000; Suzuki, 2000). One theory for why choice is so highly valued is that it permits 
us to optimise our outcomes in dynamic environments, such as the real world, where 
having options available has an adaptive advantage (Klyubin et al., 2005; Pezzulo & 
Ognibene, 2012). From an embodied perspective, the freedom of an agent strongly 
depends on the possibilities it perceives in the environment (Klyubin et al., 2005). 
The availability of choice may not depend solely on the initial options but may be 
continuously monitored as individuals prepare for upcoming decisions. Encoding of 
multiple available plans would enable an individual to flexibly update responses to 
environmental events or switch motor plans even after an action has been selected 
(Filevich & Haggard, 2013; Resulaj et al., 2009). Even if we are set on one choice, 
there is liberty in knowing that alternative options are still there, “just in case”.  
We designed this study to ensure participants did not base their decisions on real or 
constructed differences in the value of the outcome, and that commitments to 
choices were on the basis of will, or personal ownership of the choice alone. We also 
needed to ensure that there was a sufficient number of trials per condition available 
for the analysis. This came with a limitation in that the choices had no consequence, 
and the participants therefore had no objective reason to be invested in whichever 
option they chose (Bode et al., 2014). While this task feature was unavoidable, this 
nevertheless limits the ecological validity of the task design. This may be one reason 
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why they rarely changed their minds when permitted. In order to be more ecological, 
the choices would need to have different outcomes to attain. However, the fact that 
participants perceived freedom so strongly based on not only the ability to stay with 
their initial choice but availability of options, which was further evident in differences 
in neural patterns of activity, indicates that this effect exists in the absence of value.  
In summary, we found that availability of options is represented in patterns of neural 
activity and influences the perceived freedom of choice. Our results are in 
accordance with an embodied theory of volition, in which an agent’s experience of 
free choice is dependent on the opportunities for alternate actions that they perceive 
in the environment. Importantly, our findings suggest that preference for choice is not 
only related to the initial options that allow an individual to self-initiate a preferred 
choice. Rather, the continued existence of options appears to foster a sense of 
freedom as individuals prepare for upcoming actions. Ultimately, the positive 
influence on perceived freedom that choice provides may exist to promote adaptive 
behaviour in the context of a dynamic world.  
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Supplementary Data 
Table 1 Individual participant responses on the post-session questionnaire, indicating 
on what basis participants judged how free their choices were. These were post hoc 
scored according to three overall categories: the ability to carry out the initial choice, 
the availability of doors and the general feeling associated with the decision. 
Question: Scoring:   
On what basis did you judge how free 
your decisions were? 
Initial choice Availability 
of doors 
Feeling 
If I was able to stick to my decision, it felt 
like a free decision; if this was supported 
by the other door being locked, my 
decision felt 'confirmed' and more 
rewarding, but less free because the other 
option was no longer available. If both 
doors were unlocked, sticking to the 
decision and changing the decision felt 
equally free to me, as my decision in that 
case felt less affected by external 
influences. 
1 1  
My feelings    1 
On the unlocked doors, if both were 
unlocked, i felt more free 
 1  
the extent i can have my own choice 1   
i judged my decision by whether it 
matches my initial or not, it feels free 
when my initial decision was the unlocked 
one 
1   
based on is it my choice is wrong or right. 1   
If both doors were unlocked I felt very 
free, regardless of if I changed or not. If 
one door was unlocked and it didn't match 
my choice I didn't feel free. If one door 
was unlocked and it matched my choice, I 
felt less free as time went on for some 
reason. 
 1  
do not force me to change my mind to 
achieve something and I feel comfortable. 
1   
basically on my urge of the right door   1 
If my initial decision aligned with the 
unlocked door I felt my decision was still 
free 
1   
I regarded a free decision to be one that 
matched my initial choice as I was not 
redirected against my wishes, however a 
decision where I could change my 
decision at the end of the corridor seemed 
to be more free. 
1 1  
If my original choice was the same as the 
unlocked door and if both doors were 
1 1  
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unlocked I considered the decision to be 
free. 
Whether or not, after the fact, I felt as 
though I was being forced to alter my 
decision or not. If I was not forced to make 
a change I felt as though I was more free 
in my decision, particularly if both were 
unlocked allowing me to remain with my 
choice OR alter. 
1 1  
Whether it matches my initial choice and 
when both doors are unlocked  
1 1  
free to choose and change my decisions  1 1  
based on the previous choices they gave    
Whether the door I initially wanted to 
choose was still unlocked 
1   
whether or not I need to change my 
decision to get to the unlocked door 
1   
When I came to the end if I could pick the 
door I chose at the start I chose it to be 
very free 
1   
Whether the door I initially chose was 
unlocked and whether I could change 
from my original decision 
1 1  
General feeling   1 
How I generally felt at the time, at some 
points I was unsure of the decision I had 
made and so decided that my feeling of 
'freeness' was decreased.  More often 
then not though I felt free doing the task. 
  1 
Whether a door was unlocked and 
matched my original choice 
1 1  
I I was allowed to make my initital 
selection 
1   
 
17 10 4 
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